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6		
7	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA	
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF COCHISE	
9	STATE OF ARIZONA.) NO. CR20800019
10	II.	RULE 12.9 MOTION TO REMAND AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO DISMISS
11	VS.) [Oral Argument Requested]
12	•) [Otal Algument Acquested])
13	Defendant.	ĺ
))
14		
15	COMES NOW the defendant,	BRIAN POWERS, by and through his attorney, Perry Hicks
16	and, pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States	
17	Constitution, and Article II, §§ 1, 2, 4, 13, 23, 24, 32, & 33 of the Arizona Constitution and Rule	
18	i	
19	12.9 Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, moves this court to remand this case to the Grand Jury	
	for a new determination of probable cause or, in the alternative, for dismissal of all charges.	
20	This motion is based upon the	he attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities and
21	documents.	
22		D this day of March, 2018.
23	RESPECTFULLY SUDMITTED	D this day of March, 2018.
24		THE COUNTRY LAWYER, P.C.
25		p 11.
		By: Perry Hicks
26		Attorney for Defendant

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. INTRODUCTION

This case arises from the robbery of a Subway restaurant in Sierra Vista which was alleged to have taken place on December 18, 2017 and the attempted robbery of the Sierra Vista Little Ceasar's pizza shop alleged to have occurred on December 23, 2017. The investigating officers were Detective Dannels, who was the sole witness who testified before the Grand Jury, and Detective Stewart, both from the Sierra Vista Police Department.

The Grand Jury returned a true bill on the eleven-count proposed indictment provided to them. Mr. Powers seeks an Order of this Court remanding this matter to the Grand Jury for a new finding of probable cause or, alternatively, for dismissal of the current indictment.

B. FACTS AND ISSUES PRESENTED

*References to the Grand Jury transcript are enclosed within (parenthesis.) References to Exhibits, such as portions of the police reports, are enclosed within [brackets.]

The facts and issues presented before this Court, in support of Mr. Powers' motion, are as follows:

- 1. Before taking testimony, counsel for the State identified several potential witnesses and inquired of the Grand Jurors as to whether or not they knew of said witnesses (GJT p. 4). But, the prosecutor failed to so identify or inquire of the Grand Jury as to others, to wit; HSI Theresa Armstrong, "Molly" Manley (Alleged Subway victim), John Stevens (Alleged Little Ceasar's victim), Erich Nahoopi (a defense alibi witness and fact witness who had information adverse to the State's case), or alibi witness Jacob Jablonski.
- 2. The prosecutor failed to inquire of Detective Daniels as to whether or not nonlaw enforcement witnesses would be available to testify at trial.
- The prosecutor failed to advise the Grand Jury of Mr. Powers' claim of alibi or that it was supported by witnesses who were not identified to the Grand Jury as potential witnesses, but whose identities were known to the State. Although Detective Dannels testified that Mr. Powers first said that he was at his grandparents in Elgin (GJT, p.23), no such statement appears in the police reports disclosed by the State. On the other hand, however, Mr. Powers

stated to Detective Dannels that on the night and about the time of the alleged Little Cesar's incident, he was at home and then met his cousin at JR's Bar in Sierra Vista. His cousin, Jacob Jablonski, verified that he met Mr. Powers at JR's on 12/23/17 and that they stayed there until 0200 on 12/24/17.

- 4. As to the Subway incident, Detective Dannels testified that he viewed a video of the incident and that the video showed that the perpetrator held what looked like a "pencil" in his right hand. (GJT, p. 9, L. 21). Thereafter, however, and by way of leading questions, the prosecutor had Detective Dannels testify that his viewing of the video allowed him to "see a pistol." (GJT, p. 10, L. 9). The leading questioning prevailed through the next several pages of the transcript. (GJT, p. 11, et seq.)
- 5. The one Subway witness who saw the perpetrator's fully masked face, John Stevens, was shown a photo lineup by detectives. He identified a juvenile, Timothy Jongeward, as the Subway perpetrator. [Police report, p. 295]. Later, Mr. Maryland, the Little Cesar's victim, was shown a separate photo-lineup, including Jongeward and Mr. Powers, and he failed to positively identify Mr. Powers. The State failed to inform the Grand Jury that a person known to Mr. Powers, but not identified to the Grand Jury, one Erich Nahoopi, reviewed the video of the Subway incident and, despite being well familiar with Mr. Powers, he could not identify him as the perpetrator in that crime. [182.] Mr. Nahoopi also told police that Mr. Powers stopped to see him on the way to JR's (or Paul's Pub), where Mr. Powers said he was going on December 23, 2017. [182].

C. LAW AND DISCUSSION

A defendant charged by indictment and who wishes to challenge that indictment, may do so only do so by way of a motion for a new finding of probable cause which alleges that he was denied a substantial procedural right. Ariz. R. Crim. P., Rule 12.9. In this case, Mr. Powers alleges several separate grounds supporting his motion to remand. This Court is asked to consider each ground separately, and in the aggregate, and remand this matter for a new finding of probable cause.

1. THE PROSECUTOR FAILED TO IDENTIFY TO AND MAKE A PROPER INQUIRY OF THE GRAND JURY AS TO WHETHER ANY OF THEM KNEW SEVERAL OF THE WITNESSES WHO ALLEGEDLY LINKED MR. POWERS TO THE CRIMES CHARGED.

Before presentation of this case to the Grand Jury, the prosecutor represented to the Grand Jury the names of people who may be mentioned in this case, and asked them if they knew any of them. When he did so, he failed to mention several key witnesses, including alibi witnesses, relating to the alleged offenses.

While counsel for the State identified several potential witnesses, and inquired of the Grand Jurors as to whether or not they knew of said witnesses (GJT p. 4), he failed to so inquire of the Grand Jury as to others, to wit; Theresa Armstrong (an HSI agent), "Molly" Manley (an alleged Subway incident victim), John Stevens (an alleged Little Ceasar's victim), Erich Nahoopi (defense alibi witness and fact witness who had information adverse to the State's case), or Jacob Jablonski (an alibi witness).

The Grand Jurors did not register whether they knew these people or not, or whether it would affect their deliberations, since they were not told of their existence prior to the presentation of testimony.

"Statutes and rules secure an unbiased grand jury largely without defendant's or his attorney's participation. The court examines, or voir dires, the grand jurors to determine [***6] that each juror is a qualified elector of the county and can sit impartially. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 12.1, (b), 17 A.R.S. In addition, the jurors are informed of their duty to disqualify themselves from sitting on a particular matter in which they have a conflict of interest. See, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 12.1(d)(3), 17 A.R.S. Generally*** the jurors are reminded of this duty after identification of the parties in the matter under consideration."

State of Arizona v. Hastings, 162 Ariz. 117, 781 P.2d 590 (1989).

Moreover, there was never any testimony that the identified or unidentified witnesses would be available to testify at trial of the matter.

Detective Dannels did not testify as to any direct evidence that Mr. Powers was present at or perpetrated either of the alleged victimized locations, Little Ceasar's and Subway. The testimony was predominantly offered as hearsay from witnesses, disclosed and non-disclosed.

While it has been long accepted that presentation of hearsay evidence to a Grand Jury does not itself invalidate an indictment, see, Chadwick v. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S. Ct. 406, 100 L. Ed. 397 (1956), it has not been decided whether, in the absence of substantial evidence, whether an indictment based on hearsay alone violates a substantial right

of the Defendant. Indeed, implicit in the relevant decisions is the conclusion that if other, substantial evidence exists, then that the Grand Jury considered hearsay will not invalidate an indictment. On the other hand it has been said that, "If a grand jury consider [sic] competent and incompetent evidence, they can still indict if the competent evidence is sufficient to convince them there is probable cause...." See, United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 300 (ND Cal., 1952). [emphasis supplied]. See, also, Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225 (6th Cir., 1905).

This leaves us, of course, with the unanswered question of, "Does a defendant have a substantial due process right to be indicted on hearsay evidence alone only if there is little other substantial evidence presented to convince the Grand Jury that there is probable cause?" Mr. Powers submits that such a right exists. One need only look to Ariz. R. Crim. P. Rule 5.4 which governs the reliance of hearsay evidence in the preliminary hearing setting.

Rule 5.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure states, in pertinent part: "Determination of probable cause***c. Evidence. The finding of probable cause shall be based on substantial evidence, which may be hearsay in whole or in part in the following forms:

- (1) Written reports of expert witnesses;
- (2) Documentary evidence without foundation, provided there is a substantial basis for believing such foundation will be available at trial and the document is otherwise admissible;
- (3) The testimony of a witness concerning the declarations of another or others where such evidence is cumulative or there is reasonable ground to believe that the declarants will be personally available for trial.****

 Id. [emphasis supplied].

In this case, the hearsay attributed to the alleged victims and the HSI agents not only was not cumulative, it was the only evidence presented which possibly linked Mr. Powers to the alleged crime. There was no proof whatsoever offered that Mr. Powers had masks, a gun, or a bandana matching the ones claimed to have been possessed by the perpetrator. There was no substantive evidence that Mr. Powers was, himself, at the locations victimized at the time of the incidents. Only the hearsay attributed to the alleged victims and the HSI agent, who did an analysis of cell phone locations, provide any link between the offenses and Mr. Powers, however tenuous.

It cannot fairly be said that the alleged such hearsay statements constitute substantial evidence. It stands to reason that if hearsay constitutes substantial evidence in a preliminary hearing only if it is cumulative or "...there is reasonable ground to believe that the declarant will be personally available for trial...," then the term "substantial evidence" must have the same meaning in the context of a grand jury examination.

There was no testimony before the grand jury that the witnesses identified by the prosecutor, or those not identified, would be personally available at trial and there existed no reasonable ground for the grand jury to have believed that they would be. Absent such testimony, the hearsay declarations offered by the officer to the grand jury cannot be deemed relied upon to support the indictment.

It is clear that Mr. Powers had a procedural right to have the grand jury determine probable cause based upon hearsay only if the hearsay declarations were offered together with substantial evidence that he committed the crime. Mr. Powers submits that he had a substantial due process right to be indicted on hearsay evidence alone only if there was other substantial evidence presented to convince the Grand Jury that there is probable cause. There was not, and pursuant to Rule 12 a remand to the grand jury for a new finding of probable cause is required to redress the violation of Mr. Powers' due process rights.

It is beyond argument that Mr. Powers had the due process right to an unbiased Grand Jury. The Court is asked to take judicial notice that said right generally is protected by full disclosure to the Grand Jury of the participants in the case, followed by an inquiry as to whether or not those participants are known to the jurors. If a relationship with or knowledge of the participant with the juror is established, then further inquiry into whether the relationship or knowledge of a participant would influence the juror. Here, and because the prosecutor failed to ask the Grand Jurors about their relationship with several key persons involved in the investigation, there is no way for the Defendant to establish whether or not any of his Grand Jurors knew the participants, or whether such knowledge would affect their deliberations.

Because he cannot interview the Grand Jurors on the issue, there is but one

possible way to ensure that his rights are protected; that is to remand this matter for a new finding of probable cause.

2. THE PROSECUTOR FAILED TO PROPERLY ADVISE THE GRAND JURY OF MR. POWERS' CLAIM OF ALIBI OR THAT IT WAS SUPPORTED BY WITNESSES WHO WERE NOT IDENTIFIED BY THE PROSECUTOR.

In this case, the prosecutor failed to advise the Grand Jury of Mr. Powers' claim of alibi or that it was supported by witnesses, who were not identified to the Grand Jury as potential witnesses, but whose identities was known to the State. Although Detective Dannels testified that Mr. Powers first said that he was at his grandparents in Elgin (GJT, p.23), no such statement appears in the police reports disclosed by the State.

On the other hand, however, Mr. Powers did state to Detective Dannels that on the night and about the time of the alleged Little Cesar's incident, he was at home and then met his cousin at JR's Bar in Sierra Vista. His cousin, Jacob Jablonski, verified that he met Mr. Powers at JR's on 12/23/17 at about the time of the alleged crime and that they stayed there until about 0200 on 12/24/17. Mr. Powers' friend, Mr. Nahoopi, another witness not identified by the prosecutor, also told police that Mr. Powers stopped to see him on the way to JR's (or Paul's Pub), where Mr. Powers said he was going on December 23, 2017 to meet his cousin.

While under current law "alibi" is not an affirmative defense, see, A.R.S. §13-103, certainly where, as here, a potential defendant's presence at the location of alleged criminal act at the times the crime was alleged to have occurred are central to a finding of probable cause.

Simple fairness dictates that evidence or testimony that a subject of the Grand Jury consideration was not where the crime was allegedly committed at the time it was committed should be presented to them. The Second Circuit has indicated that "where a prosecutor is aware of any substantial evidence negating guilt he should, in the interests of justice, make it known to the grand jury, at least where it might reasonably be expected to lead the jury not to indict. "See, United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F/2d 616, 623 (2nd Cir. 1979).

3. Testifying before the Grand Jury regarding the Subway incident, Detective Dannels testified that he viewed a video of the incident and that the video showed that the perpetrator held what looked like a "pencil" in his right hand. (GJT, p. 9, L. 21). Thereafter, however, and by way of leading questions, the prosecutor had Detective Dannels change that testimony to reflect that his viewing of the video allowed him to "see a pistol." (GJT, p. 10, L. 9). The leading questioning prevailed through the next several pages of the transcript. (GJT, p. 11, et seq.)

The nature of the Grand Jury process and the prosecutor's role are discussed at length in Maretick v. Jarrett, 204 Ariz. 1947, 62 P.3d 120 (2003). That Court stated;

"The Supreme Court has described the grand jury as "a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused...to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimitading power or by malice or ill will. "Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962). The grand jury's mission is "to bring to trial those who may be guilty and clear the innocent." Marston's Inc. V. Strand, 114 Ariz. 260. 264, 560 P.2d 778. 782 (1977). To do its job effectively, the grand jury must receive a fair and impartial presentation of the evidence. Crimmins, 137 Ariz. At 41, 668 P.2d at 884; State V. Emery, 131 Ariz. 493, 506, 642 P.2d 838, 851 (1982). Because defendants enjoy few procedural rights before the grand jury, grand juries must be unbiased and independent and must act "independently of either prosecutor or judge." Marston's. 114 Ariz. At 264, 560 P.2d at 782.

Grand jurors have a right to hear all relevant, non-protected evidence that bears on this case. See id. Thus if the grand jurors have reasonable ground to believe that other available evidence "will explain away the contemplated charge, they may require the evidence to be produced." Ariz.Rev.State §21-412 (2002); see also *Crimmins*, 137 Ariz. At 44, 668 P.2d at 887 (Feldman, J., specially concurring).

II. THE PROSECUTOR'S ROLE

The prosecutor's role before the grand jury is unique in our system. The prosecutor acts not simply as an advocate, but as a "minister of justice." who assists the jurors in their inquiry. See Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 42, ER 3.8 cmt. Prosecutors bear a "particularly weighty duty not to influence the jury because the defendant has no representative tow atch out for his interests" before the grand jury. State v. Hocker, 113 Ariz. 450, 454, 556 P.2d 784, 788 (1976), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Jarzab, 123 Ariz. 308, 311, 599 P.2d 761, 764 (1979). The prosecutor therefore "must not take advantage of his or her role as the ex parte representative of the state before the grand jury to unduly or unfairly influence it." 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Ch. 3, Std. 3-3.5 cmt. (2d ed. 1980). Indeed, the prosecutor must

"give due deference to [the grand jury's] status as an independent legal body." Id. Significantly, the initiation and control of questioning "rests with the grand jury and not the prosecutor." Gershon v. Broomfield, 131 Ariz. 507, 509, 642 P.2d 852, 854 (1982), quoted in Crimmins, 137 Ariz. At 44, 668 P.2d at 887 (Feldman, J., specially concurring). In other words, the prosecutor's powers "are derived from the grand jury; it is the grand jury that possesses the broad investigative powers, and...must be the decision maker." Id.

In this case, where aggravated assault, attempted armed robbery and armed robbery were alleged, the issue of whether or not the perpetrator of the offenses was armed with a gun is information crucial to a determination of probable cause.

Detective Dannels initially testified that while viewing the video of the Subway incident, the alleged perpetrator appeared to be holding a "pencil" in his right hand. Thereafter, through leading questions, the prosecutor took control of the testimony. The prosecutor led the witness to change his testimony from the conclusion that the perpetrator held what looked like a "pencil," to a conclusion that the video showed the perpetrator holding a "pistol."

Clearly, and set forth in Maetrick, in this case the prosecutor acted as an advocate. The prosecutor, by leading the witness through his testimony, apparently ignored that "particularly weighty duty" not to influence the jury where, as here, Mr. Powers had no representative to watch out for his interests before the grand jury. Stated differently, the prosecutor here took advantage of his role as the ex parte representative of the state before the grand jury and used leading questions to unduly or unfairly influence it.

This Court should remand this matter for a new determination or probable cause or, alternatively dismiss the indictment.

4. The prosecutor failed to provide the Grand Jury with important exculpatory information to the Grand Jury, in violation of his duty to be a "minister of justice."

The role and responsibility of a prosecutor presenting a case to a grand jury is clearly set forth above. In this case, the prosecutor did not present important, exculpatory information to the grand jury.

In addition to the alibi information described above, the one Subway witness who saw

the perpetrator's fully-masked face, John Stevens, was initially shown a photo lineup by detectives. He positively identified a juvenile, Timothy Jongeward, as the Subway perpetrator. [Police report, p. 295]. He never identified Mr. Powers as the perpetrator. Mr. Maryland, the alleged Litttle Ceasars' victim, was shown a separate photo-lineup, including Jongeward and Mr. Powers, and he failed to 100% identify Mr. Powers, since the perpetrator wore a bandana as a mask. The Detective apparently failed to show the second photo-lineup to the Subway witness and interrupted a Grand Juror's question inquiring if the witness was shown the "current" copy. (GJT p., L.8).

So, the Subway victim never did identify Mr. Powers, but did identify Timothy Jongeward. The Little Ceasers' victim couldn't positively identify Mr. Powers. Neither apparently knew Mr. Powers.

Significantly, and in the absence of a positive victim identification of Mr. Powers as the perpetrator of the alleged crimes, Mr. Powers submits that because of the importance of the identification issue, the prosecutor had an affirmative duty to submit to the Grand Jury the fact that an acquaintance of Mr. Powers, one Erich Nahoopi, was asked to and did review the video of the Subway incident and was asked if he could identify the alleged perpetrator, but he did not recognize his friend, Mr. Powers, in the surveillance footage. [182.] This fact was not presented to the Grand Jury and certainly would, if revealed, loom largely in the determination of probable cause.

Accordingly, Mr. Powers submits that in the context of this case the prosecutor's failure to reveal the important fact of non-identification by Mr. Nahoopi constituted a further violation of the State's duty of fairness.

D. CONCLUSION

The manner in which this matter was presented to the Grand Jury significantly violated Mr. Powers' right to procedural due process and, pursuant to Rule 12.9 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal procedure, he is entitled to dismissal or, alternatively, a remand to the grand jury for a new finding of probable cause.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ______ day of March, 2018.



THE COUNTRY LAWYER, P.C.

Attorney for Defendant

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